

Climate Change and the Environment: the role of Brazil in strengthening multilateralism

Fabio Feldmann, Consultant



1/4

COLLECTION OF
POLICY PAPERS

Technical Staff

Author

Fabio Feldmann

Executive Editor

Izabella Teixeira

Editorial Managers

Julia Dias Leite

Carla Duarte

Luciana Gama Muniz

Monique Sochaczewski

Editorial Support

Gabriel Torres

Teresa Rossi

Technical Review

Carlos Arthur Ortenblad Jr.

João Gabriel Caetano Leite

Graphic design

Presto Design

Execution



The opinions expressed herein belong solely to the author.

CLIMATE CHANGE NEW
DISCUSSIONS
IN BRAZIL AND
IN THE WORLD

Climate Change and the Environment: the role of Brazil in strengthening multilateralism

Fabio Feldmann, Consultant



CLIMATE CHANGE

NEW
DISCUSSIONS
IN BRAZIL AND
IN THE WORLD

On April 11, 2019, the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI), together with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Brazil, held the first roundtable of the project "*Climate Change and Environment: the role of Brazil in strengthening multilateralism*". The project aims to contribute to broaden the knowledge of Brazilian society on global environmental issues, especially those relevant to the country's national development and international insertion that relate to the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement and its connection to Agenda 2030 and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).

Table of contents

Global context	6
<hr/>	
National context	7
<hr/>	
Subnational context	11
<hr/>	
Roundtable “Climate Change and the Environment: the role of Brazil in strengthening multilateralism”	12
<hr/>	
About CEBRI	16
<hr/>	

Global context

Global warming/climate change has been the topic of numerous scientific publications that clearly demonstrate the urgency and seriousness of the problem, calling on governments to establish a set of important mitigation initiatives, in order to meet the requirements of the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, it's not just a matter of government actions, but also of increasing the engagement of the business sector by including the climate issue in their agendas.

Likewise, the academic sector is facing several challenges to producing scientific knowledge that will allow decision makers to build these actions on an objective foundation. It also provides the media in general with guidelines that will assist awareness raising of strategic actors and individuals. These, as citizens and consumers, are having an increasingly strategic role as agents of pressure on governments and the business sector, calling on governments to formulate and implement medium and long term consistent public policies. As consumers incorporate sustainability and climate criteria in their procurement of goods and services, the corporate sector is faced with risks to and opportunities for their reputations and market positioning.

The international community, governments, the corporate sector and public opinion have increasingly recognized the importance of civil society, leading to its growing relevance in ensuring the effectiveness of international commitments and, above all, in raising their level

of ambition in the world. At the domestic level, civil society organizations monitor and supervise public policies. Today they are shouldering part of the responsibility through partnerships with public authorities and even the corporate sector.

Regarding adaptation, governments and the international community are clearly making efforts to formulate plans and projects that will enable societies to implement their own measures to increase their resilience to foreseeable impacts. The increase in number of natural disasters in Brazil - the last few weeks have seen floods and landslides in the major urban centers - provides an excellent teaching opportunity of the impacts of global warming on the water cycle.

As to the financial and corporate sector, we are witnessing a trend towards new regulatory frameworks, requiring the inclusion of climate risks in the information made available to institutional investors, capital markets and even central banks and development banks.

National context

Brazilian diplomacy has come a long way since the 1972 Stockholm Conference regarding its stance on environmental and sustainable development issues. At this first conference on the Human Environment, Brazil, like India, held that environmental concerns were part of a conspiracy of industrialized countries to derail the growth of developing nations.

This reluctance, during the military regime, was consolidated in Brazilian legislation, in the II National Development Plan (II PND), where it is stated that the worst pollution is poverty, leading Brazil to invite polluting industries to establish themselves in the country, as they would not be subject to pollution controls. Even though this conservative stance pervaded throughout the Stockholm negotiations, Brazil approved the Stockholm Declaration and other documents that urged countries to adopt national policies and incorporate environmental concerns. As a result, the Special Secretariat for the Environment (SEMA) was established in 1973, under the Ministry of the Interior. The National Environment Policy was also approved in 1981, which clearly followed the Stockholm guidelines.

In the 1980s the Brazilian position started being questioned by society and public opinion, as in the annual meeting of the Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science (SBPC) whose main theme was based on this very issue with the title “Stockholm 72 vs Cubatão 82”. The idea behind this meeting was to shed light on the consequences of equating pollution to an indicator of development, using as an example what was happening in the most important industrial region of Brazil, Cubatão. In this city, then considered to be the most polluted city in the world, called by the press “valley of death”, the rates of anencephaly were alarming.

The Brundtland Commission, created to evaluate the concrete results of the Stockholm Conference, visited Cubatão and noted in its

report *Our Common Future* the consequences of growth at any price. Furthermore, Cubatão, due to its industrial importance, was considered a national security area, as were the petrochemical and steel activities carried out there, revealing an authoritarian and irresponsible world view when it comes to environmental concerns. As an example, when the Association for Victims of Pollution and Poor Living Conditions in Cubatão was created, with the support of SBPC and other civil society organizations, questions were raised as to its legality, as it represented a threat to the Brazilian State and national security. This threat was overridden by a court order.

The environmental issue came to the fore again in the 1980s, with the disclosure of the destruction of the ozone layer by chemicals. Brazil entered the spotlight with the release of the first deforestation data by the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) in 1988 and the murder of Chico Mendes, in December of that year. The Brazilian Government struggled to understand the significance of the global discussion on environment, initially reiterating the old conspiracy theories against the country's development and associating it to vested interests in the internationalization of the Amazon.

The selection of Brazil to host a proposed second UN environment conference in 1992, a follow-up to the Stockholm Conference, represented a radical shift of the Brazilian diplomacy on this issue for several reasons. The first was that the host country is responsible

for the success of the conference, which forced diplomats and the government in general to understand the new times. The Rio Conference became an indisputable reference in every sense: from a formal point of view, the adoption of Agenda 21 and the Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity; from an informal, but extremely significant, point of view, recognition of civil society by the international community, as an essential representative of society in parallel to governments.

But the Rio Conference also led to a fragmentation of the governance of the various environmental issues. Each convention established its own regime, resulting in greater complexity when promoting the synergy required between climate change vs biodiversity vs depletion of the ozone layer, since each Convention has its own regulatory framework (Climate Change Convention, Convention on Biological Diversity, Vienna Convention/ Montreal Protocol).

Brazil has had a prominent role in the Climate Change Convention since the first Conference of the Parties and notably during the Kyoto Protocol (COP 3), where the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was created based on a Brazilian proposal.

Two important structures were established in Brazil: the Interministerial Commission on Climate Change (1999) and the Brazilian Climate Change Forum (FBMC) (2000), both aiming at incorporating the Kyoto results into public policies. In the case of FBMC, the aim was to provide a strategic role for the Presidential Office when faced with demands arising from meetings with heads of states, in addition to creating a privileged space for dialogue among government, civil society, and the corporate and academic sectors.

In 2002, Brazil also played an important role in the Johannesburg Summit, although there were no major repercussions.

When the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) were published in 2007, the climate issue returned to the front

pages at home and abroad, as it had in the 1980s. The scientific community changed its tune when it recognized global warming and warned of its dramatic impacts on a different timescale. Land use change and deforestation were seen to contribute significantly to greenhouse gas emissions, which increased the responsibility of Brazil and other forest-rich nations. Once again, the international community asked Brazil to play a leading role in making the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities more flexible.

In 2009, in Copenhagen (COP 15), the presence of the most important world leaders did not ensure successful negotiations but showed new paths in diplomatic negotiations and in the definition of commitments to be met by all countries. In Brazil, the National Climate Change Policy (PNMC) was enacted with important legal guidelines, like incorporating climate issues in public policies, and establishing that FBMC and the Interministerial Commission were policy instruments.

Several other state and municipal laws and regulations were also enacted in that year. The C-27 was created, bringing together all Brazilian state capitals to discuss climate issues.

When Brazil hosted the Rio+20 in 2012, it established the conditions for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The SDGs were approved by the UN General Assembly in 2015. The 17 SDGs and the 169 targets represented a great improvement over Agenda 21, as they conferred greater objectivity to international commitments, associated to a specific timetable.

The 2015 Paris Agreement represented the greatest diplomatic achievement of the last few years. The Agreement included all countries in a bottom-up process and ensured domestic incorporation of the commitments through the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), which later became the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

New political arrangements were structured to complement existing ones. BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, China and India) adopted a new approach,

with a view to replacing the G-77, which due to the inclusion of countries with conflicting interests lost its capacity for leadership and representability. How to reconcile oil producing countries with those most affected by climate change? How to require technology transfer from countries like China that today sends people to the earth's orbit?

The purpose of this report is to record Brazil's indisputable leading role in the negotiations because of the sheer size of its GHG emissions and its capacity for establishing bridges among countries and blocs. With respect to the emissions from deforestation, the downward trend is a testament to national efforts and INPE's unique monitoring capacity. INPE data undergoes thorough analysis by civil society, for example the Amazonian Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) and the Amazon Man and Environment Institute (IMAZON).

In the current administration, Brazil is experiencing a singular moment. For the first time in decades, the policy is to dehydrate environmentalism, particularly land use and climate change policies. The emerging scenario is one of possible setbacks in those sectors resistant to recent environmental policies and legislation. Government guidelines suggest the weakening of the surveillance capacity of environment agencies to favor economic growth at any cost and increased flexibility of environmental licensing. But, not everyone who is politically in tune with the current Brazilian Government is necessarily against sustainable development or endorses climate denial theories.

The political guidelines of the current Brazilian Government are evident not only in the statements made by authorities but also in the institutional changes that have altered the systems of environmental governance and management in Brazil. These changes are not restricted to the federal environment system but have also affected the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Theories like "climate denial" and combating globalization based on "cultural Marxism" permeate the foreign policy espoused by the government, forcing Brazilian diplomats

to step down from their well-known leadership role in international negotiations, generating embarrassing situations with diplomats from other nations.

As to the Ministry of the Environment, evidence points to its reduced political role in the Government, which not only affects environmental policies but also its role as coordinator of public policies for sustainable development. The loss of strategic institutional areas that dealt with climate change, the implementation of the Forest Code and sustainable consumption and production are examples of this diminished political relevance. Conspiracy theories involving Brazilian agriculture could be clearly seen in the response given to a manifesto signed by 602 European scientists and 2 Brazilian indigenous organizations, published in *Science* on April 26, 2019. The manifesto called on the European Union to make sustainability a condition for the bloc's commercial negotiations with Brazil, including reducing deforestation, protecting indigenous rights and participation of local communities in commercial agreements. The Minister for the Environment countered the manifesto saying it was a commercial discussion in disguise and had no credibility. These conspiracy theories lack originality and scientific foundation.

Other initiatives promoted by the current Brazilian Government confirm this trend, such as the generalized depreciation of civil society and the announced changes in the Amazon Fund. Furthermore, the current Brazilian Government was motivated to remain in the Paris Agreement for reasons other than its strategic role in achieving globally agreed commitments to address climate change (such as commercial and economic factors, because of the keen interest of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food and other economic agents).

Even though initially the Government was true to its election promises, its actions have been marked by gross mistakes due to its poor knowledge of the law, especially the 1988 Federal Constitution. This has led the government to retreat, sometimes "voluntarily", sometimes after

court rulings. In areas of strong environmental and climate interest, the tumultuous relationship of the Executive Branch with Congress has not shown the Government in a good light. This was seen when the Senate did not appraise Provisional Act No. 867 - signed by former President Michel Temer, on December 28, 2018 - within the period mandated by the Constitution. This Act pushed forward the date by which rural landowners had to adapt to the Forest Code to December 31, 2019. It was supposed to have been voted by June 3, 2019 at the Senate (after having been voted in the Chamber of Deputies), but since it wasn't, it is no longer valid.

There is a lot of uncertainty in Congress with respect to climate and environmental issues in general. The Permanent Joint Committee of the National Congress on Climate Change (CMMC) was not installed as party leaders did not indicate members, thus temporarily eliminating an important discussion forum. On the plus side, a Working Group was established by the President of the Chamber of Deputies to discuss the General Licensing Bill, which will, in principle, allow for more balanced legislation in line with the recent statements of the Chamber President.

Another aspect to be discussed - related to strategies and actions - is the Parliamentary Environmental Caucus. During the National Constitutional Assembly, an all-party group was created, which had an essential role when the "*Centrão*" (group of parties with no particular ideology but who desire to remain close to the government) emerged, with proposals to dehydrate the constitutional provisions under discussion.

Subnational context

Brazil is a Federation, which means that there is a constitutional division of responsibilities among federal, state and local governments. The 1988 Federal Constitution explicitly determines that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall conduct foreign policy, but it provides the National Congress with a peculiar role. We have not adopted the North American model, which, constitutionally, attributes foreign policy responsibilities to the Senate, neither have we followed some European countries, whose approval of international treaties does not need ratification by their parliaments.

While the Federal Government is responsible for representing Brazil in the international community, states and municipalities have clear mandates to legislate on the issues, in addition to administrative actions. Consequently, many states and municipalities have policies for climate change, with differentiated targets and obligations. Thus, there is enormous potential for working together with states and municipalities. In this sense, the event held by the Brazilian Climate Change Forum in April 2019 was essential as it marked the political engagement of governors of important Brazilian states such as São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, Espírito Santo, Pará, Rio de Janeiro, Paraná, Pernambuco, Amazonas and Mato Grosso do Sul, in addition to the possibility of reviving some state forums established some years ago: São Paulo Forum for Global Climate Change and Biodiversity, Minas Gerais Forum for Global Climate Change, Bahia Forum for Global Climate Change and Biodiversity, Espírito Santo Forum for Climate Change and Sound Use of Water and the Paraná Forum for Global Climate Change.

Roundtable “Climate Change and the Environment: the role of Brazil in strengthening multilateralism”

The event was held on April 11, 2019, at CEBRI headquarters to debate the following issues:

- Challenges in implementing Brazil's NDC:
 - (a) Governance model for a low-carbon economy in Brazil.
 - (b) Technological innovation, financing and regulation agendas.
- What would be the roadmap for low-carbon development in Brazil?
- In which aspects of low-carbon development could Brazil be a leader?
- How does Brazil benefit by integrating the biodiversity conservation and climate change agendas?
- The role of Brazilian cities in the execution of the national climate change agenda.
- What are the risks for Brazil of not implementing the Paris Agreement?

The overall objective of the roundtable was to provide new impetus to the Paris Agreement and increase the ambition of Brazil's NDC.

Specific objectives were:

- Prepare an agenda for the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit, to be held just before the UN General Assembly opens.
- Discuss climate governance beyond government; role of BNDES (in the new context of minimal State).
- Revive Brazil's leadership in the climate and sustainable development agenda.

With emphasis on the following issues:

- Security and climate;
- Environmental displacement;
- Food safety and agriculture;
- Human integrity = health, climate and migration.

As noted during the opening by the former Minister of the Environment, Izabella Teixeira:

- a) Climate and development cannot be separated;
- b) Need to strengthen the link between science and politics;
- c) Promote synergy between climate and biodiversity towards COP 15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity in Beijing 2020;
- d) Leverage the ongoing discussion on chemicals vs ozone layer vs climate change.

Furthermore, she recalled an ongoing discussion about the right locus to address climate change: would the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) be the best place to follow up on the global implementation of NDCs? How could the synergy among the various climate change institutions be encouraged, as well as among the conventions dealing with related issues? How can we go about the need to establish connections between global warming and other international conventions: global warming vs refugees vs children vs human rights?

We could think of identifying strategies that reflect these connections at the regional and national levels:

- Consider victims of recent natural disasters as “climate refugees”?
- Use the Child and Adolescent Statute for possible climate litigation, given the serious impacts of climate change/air pollution (reference to United Nations Fund for Childhood (UNICEF) studies)?
- Revive the idea that the Amazon Cooperation Treaty (ACT) can engage in global warming issues and even propose a scientific evaluation of the impact of climate change on the Amazon Basin, like the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA).

Brazil’s relevance in climate change forums is unequivocal, as is the case for environmental issues in general. We should always operate

with this premise in mind when formulating international and national strategies.

After this initial statement, several initiatives were discussed, for example seeking inspiration in the recent proposal of a “Green New Deal” in the US, with the aim of connecting global warming to the economy, jobs and inequality. In agriculture, Brazil has the undeniable advantage of its experience with low-carbon agriculture and the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) has an undisputed installed capacity for dealing with climate issues.

Thus, we must seek new areas of action to prevent backtracking. We have seen that it is possible to attract specific groups that can exert pressure on segments of the government that are not aligned to denialism and revisionism, expressed in tirades against globalization, civil society and climate change (MRE, MMA and GSI - Office for Institutional Security).

We are referring to the financial sector: during the G20 meeting in June 2019, a report entitled “Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures: 2019 Status Report” was published. Concerns over the risks of global warming to financial sector assets have been studied and we should make these concerns clear to B3 (Brazil Stock Exchange) and the Brazilian Federation of Banks (FEBRABAN).

The mere fact that these institutions are paying attention to these issues would have important repercussions in the Central Bank, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil (CVM) and even experts in Brazilian economic policy, like the Minister for the Economy, Paulo Guedes. We believe that this strategy would dehydrate the merely rhetorical and ideological discourse of the President of the Republic, Jair Bolsonaro.

The 2006 Stern Review exerted significant impact on public opinion, regardless of its merits or scientific and academic consistency, since it was written by the former Chief Economist of the World Bank, Nicholas Stern, with indisputable credibility and credentials. Something similar

occurred in 2014 when the report "Risky Business: The Economic Risks of Climate Change in the United States" was published, spearheaded by Michael Bloomberg, Henry Paulson Jr. and Thomas Steyer.

In the specific case of CVM, we would have to encourage it to follow the steps of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which for many years has been requiring the disclosure of environmental and climate risks of the companies in the capital markets of the US (Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change).

There are two paths to put these suggestions into practice:

a) Carry out an event at CEBRI in partnership with FEBRABAN and B3, with possible participation of international experts to discuss the issue, in addition to Brazilians with credibility. This alternative would require resources and time to organize;

b) Holding an event at the Chamber of Deputies and/or the Senate, in the appropriate thematic committees, in order to lend the institutional charisma of these entities to the issues and providing a public forum. This alternative would be more economical.

Lastly, we return to the idea of dealing with deforestation in the Amazon as one of the faces of organized crime in Brazil, similar to the occupation of preserved areas with springs in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the former under the control of the First Command of the Capital (PCC) and the latter under the control of militia groups, as recently reported in the press.

In the case of deforestation, a police investigation should be carried out to deal specifically with this issue, to identify the "modus operandi" and the perpetrators of criminal acts.

To this end there are ongoing initiatives in the Office of the Attorney General and, more recently, the Office of the São Paulo State Attorney, with the aim of bringing this idea to the National Council of Attorneys General (CNPAG).

Since this is a relatively unexplored topic, it would be important to hold a meeting of experts and civil society institutions specialized in security and combating violence. It may also be possible to engage the Instituto Igarapé and other entities.

Deforestation in the Amazon may need to be addressed with strategies and tactics used in combating environmental crimes. Ending illegal deforestation in the Amazon is not only part of Brazil's commitment under the Paris Agreement, but it is an illegal activity that leads to tax evasion and infringes individual and collective rights.

We should also engage the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB Brasil) in the climate issue since it enjoys undeniable institutional prestige and capacity to interact with all spheres of government (Executive, Legislative and Judiciary), as well as a wide reach, since it is organized in local and state sections. Brazil has around 1.1 million lawyers that are members of the Bar Association.

One other group we should not neglect are the deputies and senators, who, although belonging to parties that support the government, do not necessarily endorse the aforementioned conservative agenda. We should recall the experience of the National Constitutional Assembly, when a large parliamentary group was created with members from various parties that was crucial to approve the 1988 Federal Constitution.

Although the Parliamentary Environmental Caucus exists formally in the National Congress, there needs to be innovation in order to bring in parties that don't belong to it, seeking to attract, in particular, recently elected congressmen.

Also, we cannot fail to include the evangelical community. According to the North American experience, we need to expend much effort to attract them, without prejudice, to combat global warming. Since the 1990s, in the initiatives related to the Rio Conference, multi-religion events have been held with the clear purpose of engaging religions and religious leaders in the "protection of the planet". This had great repercussion in governmental and

political spheres, but it should be noted that the actions of the evangelical churches have made a difference in the discussions in the US Congress, as seen in the publishing of “Caring for Creation: The Evangelical’s Guide to Climate Change and a Healthy Environment”, by Mitch Hescocx and Paul Douglas.

In Brazil, during the National Constitutional Assembly, efforts were made to raise the awareness of the evangelicals during the approval of the chapter on the environment. There is, therefore, no reason not to try to attract the evangelical group in Congress and understand the importance it has in the context of Brazilian elections and politics.

For this purpose, we could hold events for religious leaders, including making use of existing inter-faith dialogs. Then we would have the concrete possibility of bringing new constituencies to the fight against global warming.

They could act in several directions, such as mitigating the initiatives of the Brazilian Government in Congress and diplomacy, as did the Rural Caucus members when they made sure that Brazil remained in the Paris Agreement, because of the risks their agricultural products would undergo when exported to European markets.

With the announcement of the agreement between the European Union and Mercosur, a path is opened to ensure that sustainability/ deforestation criteria will be applied to commodities exports and that pesticides will be under strict control.

To conclude, we would like to stress the need to encourage a new kind of coordination to address the notorious difficulties arising from the drastic change of position of the current Federal Government on climate change by leveraging new constituencies, highlighting the potential for environmental and climate litigation, raising the awareness of the corporate and financial sectors and encouraging processes that engage domestic and international consumers along the various value chains.

About CEBRI



The Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) is an independent think tank that contributes to building an international agenda for Brazil. For over twenty years, the institution has engaged in promoting a pluralistic and proposal-oriented debate on the international landscape and Brazilian foreign policy.

In its activities, CEBRI prioritizes themes with the greatest potential to leverage the country's international insertion into the global economy, proposing pragmatic solutions for the formulation of public policies.

It is a non-profit institution, headquartered in Rio de Janeiro and internationally recognized. Today, its circa 100 associates represent diverse interests and economic sectors and mobilize a worldwide network of professionals and organizations. Moreover, CEBRI has an active Board of Trustees composed of prominent members of Brazilian society.

THINKING
DIALOGUING
DISSEMINATING
INFLUENCING

#2 Think tank in Brazil

#3 Think tank in Latin America

University of Pennsylvania's Think Tanks
and Civil Societies Program Index

Boards

Chairman

José Pio Borges

Honorary Chairman

Fernando Henrique Cardoso

Vice Chairmen

José Alfredo Graça Lima

Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa

Tomas Zinner

Vice Chairmen Emeriti

Daniel Klabin

José Botafogo Gonçalves

Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves

Rafael Benke

Trustees Emeriti

Celso Lafer

Luiz Fernando Furlan

Marcos Azambuja

Pedro Malan

Roberto Teixeira da Costa

Rubens Ricupero

Executive Director

Julia Dias Leite

Board of Trustees

André Clark

Anna Jaguaribe

Armando Mariante

Armínio Fraga

Carlos Mariani Bittencourt

Cláudio Frischtak

Demétrio Magnoli

Edmar Bacha

Gelson Fonseca Jr.

Henrique Rzezinski

Ilona Szabó

Joaquim Falcão

Jorge Marques de Toledo Camargo

José Aldo Rebelo

José Luiz Alquéres

Luiz Ildelfonso Simões Lopes

Marcelo de Paiva Abreu

Marcos Galvão

Maria do Carmo (Kati) Nabuco de Almeida Braga

Paulo Hartung

Renato Galvão Flôres Jr.

Roberto Abdenur

Ronaldo Veirano

Sérgio Amaral

Vitor Hallack

Winston Fritsch

International Board

Albert Fishlow

Alfredo Valladão

Andrew Hurrell

Felix Peña

Flávio Damico

Julia Sweig

Kenneth Maxwell

Leslie Bethell

Marcos Caramuru

Marcos Jank

Monica de Bolle

Sebastião Salgado

Members

Institutions

ABIQUIM
 Aeróleo Táxi Aéreo
 BAMIN
 Banco Bocom BBM
 BMA Advogados
 BNDES
 BRF
 Brookfield Brasil
 Bunker One
 Captalys Investimentos
 CCCC South America Regional Company
 Colégio Bandeirantes
 Consulado Geral da Holanda no Rio de Janeiro
 Consulado Geral da Irlanda em São Paulo
 Consulado Geral da Noruega no Rio de Janeiro
 Consulado Geral do México no Rio de Janeiro
 CTG Brasil
 Dannemann, Siemsen, Bigler & Ipanema Moreira
 Dynamo
 EDP
 Eletrobras
 Energisa
 ENEVA
 ENGIE Brasil
 Equinor
 ExxonMobil
 FCC S.A
 Grupo Lorentzen
 IBÁ
 IBP
 IBRAM
 Icatu Seguros
 Ipanema Investimentos
 Itaú Unibanco
 JETRO
 Klabin
 Lazard
 McLarty Associates
 Museu do Amanhã
 Michelin
 Neoenergia
 Oktri Empreendimentos
 Paper Excellence
 Petrobras
 Pinheiro Neto Advogados
 Prumo Logística
 Queiroz Galvão
 Repsol Sinopec
 Sanofi
 Santander
 Shell
 Siemens
 Souza Cruz
 State Grid
 Tecnoil
 Total E&P do Brasil
 Vale
 Veirano Advogados
 Vinci Partners

Individual Members

Adriano Abdo
 Álvaro Otero
 Armínio Fraga
 Carlos Leoni de Siqueira
 Carlos Mariani Bittencourt
 Celso Lafer
 Claudine Bichara de Oliveira
 Cristina Pinho
 Décio Oddone
 Eduardo Marinho Christoph
 Eduardo Prisco Ramos
 Fernando Bodstein
 Fernando Cariola Travassos
 Frederico Axel Lundgren
 Guilherme Frering
 Henrique Rzezinski
 Jaques Scvirer
 João Felipe Viegas Figueira de Mello
 João Roberto Marinho
 José Francisco Gouvêa Vieira
 José Roberto de Castro Neves
 Larissa Wachholz
 Laura Pinheiro
 Leonardo Coelho Ribeiro
 Marcelo Weyland Barbosa Vieira
 Marcio João de Andrade Fortes
 Maria Pia Mussnich
 Mauro Viegas Filho
 Najad Khouri
 Paulo Ferracioli
 Pedro Leitão da Cunha
 Ricardo Haddad
 Ricardo Levisky
 Roberto Abdenur
 Roberto Amadeu Milani
 Roberto Guimarães Martins-Costa
 Roberto Pereira de Almeida
 Roberto Prisco Paraiso Ramos
 Roberto Teixeira da Costa
 Rosana Lanzelotte
 Sergio Zappa
 Stelio Marcos Amarante
 Thomas Trebat
 Tomas Zinner
 Victor Galante
 Vitor Hallack

CLIMATE CHANGE

NEW
DISCUSSIONS
IN BRAZIL AND
IN THE WORLD



Brazilian Center for International Relations

Rua Marquês de São Vicente, 336 Gávea
Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brasil
22451-044
+55 (21) 2206-4400
cebri@cebri.org.br
www.cebri.org



Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. (KAS)

Klingelhöferstraße 23
10785 Berlin
Germany
+49 30 26996-0
zentrale-berlin@kas.de
www.kas.de