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RELATÓRIO CONSOLIDADO DA REUNIÃO

FACT SHEET

Tema: A liderança de Xi Jinping: o XIX Congresso do Partido Comunista Chinês e perspectivas

- Possíveis impactos na direção do processo de reformas: para onde devemos olhar?

- O socialismo com características chinesas para uma nova era: significado político

- Perspectivas de política externa e possíveis impactos na relação com a América Latina

O XIX Congresso do Partido Comunista da China (PCCh), realizado entre 18 e 24 de outubro, consolidou o poder do Secretário-Geral do partido e Presidente da China, Xi Jinping, e selou mudanças no principal órgão de poder naquele país, o Comitê Permanente do Politburo do Comitê Central do PCCh. O Congresso do partido, que ocorre a cada cinco anos, é formado por cerca de 2.300 membros e elege o Comitê Central, formado por 204 membros e 172 membros-alternos, que é o principal órgão decisório entre as sessões do Congresso. O Comitê Central elege o Secretário-Geral, os vinte e cinco membros do Politburo e confirma os membros da Comissão Central Militar. O link a seguir traz os nomes e biografias dos novos líderes. https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/chinas-new-politburo-standing-committee/

Tendo em vista o enorme peso da China na economia mundial e a crescente influência regional e global do país, o Congresso, que atraiu grande atenção internacional, teve como um de seus principais resultados a inclusão do "pensamento de Xi Jinping sobre o socialismo com características chinesas para uma nova era" na Constituição do partido, o que tem sido visto como uma equiparação da liderança de Xi Jinping àquela de Mao Zedong e Deng Xiaoping. Este link contém a íntegra do discurso de Xi Jinping na abertura do Congresso, que teve a duração de mais de três horas (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm). Embora o "pensamento" se preste a muitas leituras e interpretações, ele tem pelo menos dois objetivos definidos: fazer com que a China, de 2020 até 2035, evolua de uma sociedade moderadamente próspera para uma líder em inovação, com redução das disparidades regionais e melhoras significativas na esfera ambiental; e levar a China a um status de grande país socialista - próspero, forte, democrático, avançado culturalmente, harmônico e bonito - e líder global em 2049, ano que coincidirá com o centenário da Revolução Comunista.

Nas próprias palavra de Xi Jinping durante o discurso de abertura do XIX Congresso:

"This is what socialism with Chinese characteristics entering a new era means:

The Chinese nation, which since modern times began had endured so much for so long, has achieved a tremendous transformation: it has stood up, grown rich, and is becoming strong; it has come to embrace the brilliant prospects of rejuvenation. It means that scientific socialism is full of vitality in 21st century China, and that the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics is now flying high and proud for all to see. It means that the path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics have kept developing, blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization. **It offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind**.

This new era will be an era of building on past successes to further advance our cause, and of continuing in a new historical context to strive for the success of socialism with Chinese characteristics. **It will be an era of securing a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, and of moving on to all-out efforts to build a great modern socialist country**. It will be an era for the Chinese people of all ethnic groups to work together and work hard to create a better life for themselves and ultimately achieve common prosperity for everyone. **It will be an era for all of us, the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, to strive with one heart to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. It will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind.**

As socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era, the principal contradiction facing Chinese society has evolved. **What we now face is the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-growing needs for a better life**. China has seen the basic needs of over a billion people met, has basically made it possible for people to live decent lives, and will soon bring the building of a moderately prosperous society to a successful completion. The needs to be met for the people to live better lives are increasingly broad. **Not only have their material and cultural needs grown; their demands for democracy, rule of law, fairness and justice, security, and a better environment are increasing.** At the same time, China's overall productive forces have significantly improved and in many areas our production capacity leads the world. The more prominent problem is that our development is unbalanced and inadequate. This has become the main constraining factor in meeting the people's increasing needs for a better life.

....

We must recognize that the evolution of the principal contradiction facing Chinese society does not change our assessment of the present stage of socialism in China. **The basic dimension of the Chinese context—that our country is still and will long remain in the primary stage of socialism—has not changed. China's international status as the world's largest developing country has not changed.** The whole Party must be completely clear about this fundamental dimension of our national context, and must base our work on this most important reality—the primary stage of socialism...."

A leitura do discurso de Xi Jinping, ao mesmo tempo que em explicita conceitos, avalia o trabalho do partido e define metas, deixa entrever a complexidade de interpretação desses aspectos, não raro remetendo a expressões obscuras para os estrangeiros. Em negrito, realçaram-se alguns trechos que jogam luz sobre o pensamento de Xi Jinping e, ao mesmo tempo, refletem uma nova postura da liderança chinesa em relação ao mundo, que deixa para trás o perfil baixo advogado por Deng Xiaoping e chega a posicionar-se como um modelo a ser seguido pelos demais países, seja pelas suas conquistas em termos de governança, seja por sua capacidade em contribuir para o futuro da humanidade. Destaque-se, ainda, a mudança da "principal contradição" da sociedade chinesa, que agora está relacionada ao crescimento desequilibrado e inadequado, em face das crescentes necessidades do povo por uma vida melhor (ou mais "bonita").

À luz dos resultados do XIX Congresso do PCCh, a terceira reunião do Grupo Permanente de Análise sobre China do CEBRI pretende jogar luz sobre o significado daqueles resultados, sua importância para a evolução da China e da economia global, e também seus efeitos do ponto de vista internacional. Ao mesmo tempo em que se devem evitar conclusões apressadas sobre os resultados desse evento, cujas consequências se farão sentir ao longo dos próximos meses e anos, cabe refletir desde já sobre algumas das principais questões suscitadas.

- Do ponto de vista das reformas econômicas, que conclusões podemos tirar? Muitos ressaltam positivamente o fato de não se ter adotado ainda uma meta de crescimento do PIB, o que daria mais graus de liberdade para a nova liderança realizar reformas. Ao mesmo tempo, há dúvidas sobre como essa falta de uma diretriz mensurável poderá afetar as lideranças locais, grandes artífices do crescimento mas também dos desequilíbrios da economia chinesa. Em última instância, é certo dizer que Xi Jinping acumulou tanto poder para levar adiante as reformas? Ou será que as composições políticas forçarão revisões das reformas anunciadas pelo próprio Xi Jinping em 2013? O que esperar da reforma das SOEs e da estrutura de *mixed ownership*? O contínuo apoio à expansão das empresas chinesas no exterior também será acompanhado de maior acesso aos mercados chineses do ponto de vista de investimentos (e.g. listas negativas)? Devemos esperar sinais inequívocos de *deleveraging* e aprofundamento da consolidação de algumas indústrias?

- Do ponto de vista político, a consolidação de poder de Xi Jinping e a determinação de aprofundar e alargar a campanha anticorrupção de fato devolveram maior poder ao partido? O enfraquecimento do modelo de liderança coletiva seria um resultado do XIX Congresso? Como descrever o equilíbrio refletido no novo comitê permanente do Politburo? Seria apressado tirar conclusões sobre a falta de um sucessor designado de Xi Jinping? Qual a real importância do partido para o cidadão chinês comum? Tem ele hoje mais confiança no futuro do que há um mês? Como a nova grande contradição em termos de necessidades crescentes para uma vida melhor se coaduna com o fortalecimento das diretrizes do partido sobre a coletividade e a diminuição do espaço para divergências?

- Do ponto de vista de política externa, pode-se dizer que o XIX Congresso prenuncia os contornos de um mundo sinocêntrico? O grande rejuvenescimento da sociedade chinesa comportará um mundo multipolar/bipolar? Como os novos elementos que traz a China para uma ordem em transição (*Belt and Road Initiative*, Banco Asiático de Investimentos em Infraestrutura, e outras iniciativas de liderança no seio dos BRICS, do G-20 e do entorno asiático) impactam a América Latina e o Brasil? O fato de um ex-ministro dos negócios estrangeiros e Conselheiro de Estado ter ascendido ao Comitê Central pode ser interpretado como uma continuidade da atual política externa e fortalecimento dessa área no governo chinês? A recente visita do Presidente Donald Trump à China e a outros países asiáticos permite comentários à luz dos resultados do XIX Congresso?

Sugestões de leitura

"Xi Jinping: The Future of China. The 19th Party Congress in Review (October 2017)". https://www.brunswickgroup.com/media/3433/19th-party-congress-report-2017-10-27-final_04.pdf

"The New Era of Chinese Socialism", by Andrew Batson, Gavekal research (October 19, 2017).

"After Xi's Coronation", by Yanmei Xie, Gavekal Reserach, October 25, 2017)

"The Reconstruction of the Administrative State", by Andrew Batson, October 31, 2017.

"The Paradox of Xi's Power", by Minxin Pei, October 27, 2017. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/xi-power-national-congress-weakness-by-minxin-pei-2017-10

"China's New Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee", by Chen Li, October 26, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/chinas-new-politburo-standing-committee/

"The paradoxical outcome of China's 19th Party Congress", by Chen Li, October 26, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/26/the-paradoxical-outcome-of-chinas-19th-party-congress/

Third Meeting Report

Possible impacts on the direction of the reform process: Where to look at?

At its third meeting, CEBRI's Permanent Working Group on China promoted a wide-ranging debate on the results of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), encompassing themes such as the continuity of the agenda of domestic economic reforms and the political implications of Xi Jinping's "socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era". Furthermore, discussions highlighted the increasing assertiveness of Chinese foreign policy and its consequences for global institutions and regions such as Latin America.

As a primary characteristic of Chinese economic policy, participants emphasized the dynamic and often (apparently) contradictory relationship between market forces and state intervention in the Chinese economy (*decisive* role for the market and *dominant* role for the state). The experience of past decades demonstrates, ultimately, a *modus operandi* in which market forces are allowed to operate freely until major imbalances require punctual state intervention. This trend is observed, for example, in the process leading to the current overcapacity crisis (particularly apparent in the sectors of steel and coal) or in the current massive outflow of overseas direct investment, recently curbed by the adoption of capital controls. In the first case, dramatic state intervention has been observed both in structural supply side reforms and in demand stimuli through increased credit growth rates. In sum, *disciplined markets* have been key to the good results of the Chinese economy.

Moreover, a key takeaway from Xi Jinping's opening speech at the 19th CPC Congress refers to the emphasis placed on enhancing Chinese population's *quality of life*, instead of focusing solely on promoting GDP growth – for which the Party has not announced specific targets. This represents a strategic shift insofar as it contributes to a political framework in which future reductions in expected GDP growth rates would be more easily accepted by the domestic public. As such, instead of primarily targeting GDP growth, Chinese economic policy would focus on goals such as reducing shadow banking and tightening control over financial institutions, through unified state monitoring and financial system reforms. Actually, one of the first policies adopted after the Congress was the establishment under the State Council of a Committee on Financial Stability and Development, presided over by a vice-premier.

In face of China's growing public and private debt, continuity is expected in the process of reforming State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) – which were characterized as the main executive arm of the Party's policies, together with the Central

Government. Ultimately, the Party's guidelines on SOE investments (including the recent curb on some activities) would have contributed positively to reducing uncertainty among public and private actors. On the other hand, uncertainties remain in the field of tax reform, regarded as one of the most difficult challenges faced by the Central Government in the short and medium term.

Furthermore, in the field of industrial policy, participants highlighted the ambitious plans aimed at upgrading Chinese industry, promoting innovation and achieving leadership in high tech sectors, particularly through the *Made in China 2025* plan. On the downside, some analysts consider such plans have been implemented within a highly protectionist framework and an asymmetric investment environment, in which significant barriers remain for foreign investments in China.

Overall, rather than announcing major changes in the direction of economic policy, the 19th Congress featured the crystallization of the agenda of economic reforms pursued in past years, with only incremental refinements to its execution. After all, the Congress was about the power of the Party and not about economic policy.

Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era: political meaning

One of the main particularities of the 19th CPC Congress was the unparalleled clarity with which Xi Jinping exposed Chinese ambitions for the global role it seeks to play in the next decades: Xi Jinping's thoughts on Chinese socialism, which have been embedded to the Party's constitution, portray China as a protagonist in the international sphere and set the goal of becoming a "leading nation in terms of national power and global impact" by the 100th anniversary of the Communist Revolution, in 2049, having also clear mid-term targets for 2020 (moderately well-off society by all-round way) and 2035 (modern socialist country).

Above all, the 19th Congress featured the consolidation of power under Xi Jinping, who was able to make a strong circle of allies and who has no clearly designated successor, which means his influence is expected to be prolonged, for at least ten more years. Despite the constitutional limit in serving two consecutive terms, possible measures to accommodate Xi Jinping's extended influence include assuming other high ranking posts or even changing Party rules in order to allow for a third term. Furthermore, the consolidation of Xi Jinping's power does not contradict the strengthening of the Communist Party itself, which has also been experiencing positive changes towards a more meritocratic and rule-based system, concomitant with the widespread domestic perception of China as a strong state under Xi Jinping. In fact, participants highlighted the global trend towards a more centralized state, as observed in Europe and the United States, reflecting an overall notion that globalization expanded excessively.

Moreover, although Xi Jinping's remarks on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era portray it as a "new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence", participants questioned the extent to which China aims to effectively export its own model to other regions, serving as a missionary for a Chinese approach to economic policy and political organization. A more realistic analysis would interpret China's ambition as one aimed at reducing the influence of the traditional Western model, by reiterating states' capacity to develop their own independent economic and political structures in accordance to their particular circumstances ("rise of difference"). If in the past westerners doubted the chances of survival of the authoritarian Chinese model, many might now think that it could be even more sustainable than the American model.

In regard to the nature of the Chinese democratic system, it was noted that the 19^{th} Congress featured more transparency than previous ones – although much of the Party's decision-making is still impenetrable. For instance, despite all the international interest, the process of selection of the Chinese leadership – notably the appointment of the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo – remains very opaque. But the Congress was a confidence boosting for the leadership and society, which now have clear targets for the next three decades. Furthermore, positive remarks include the increasing role played by academia and think tanks in providing inputs to policymaking in China. On the other hand, participants highlighted the striking differences between the traditional Western conception of democracy and its Chinese version, which comes closer to a concept of "good governance", supposedly aimed at the interests of the Chinese people.

Foreign policy perspectives and possible impacts for Latin America

The 19^{th} Congress of the Communist Party of China has reaffirmed the significant shift observed in Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping, featuring an increasingly active search for a center stage position in international affairs, by translating Chinese economic power into political power in the 21^{st} century. In sharp contrast to Deng Xiaoping's low-profile approach to foreign affairs, associated to the doctrine of Chinese "peaceful rise", Xi Jinping's first mandate has featured a strong focus on leveraging Chinese influence over global institutions and promoting Chinese overseas investments – an approach expected to be further expanded under Xi Jinping's second tenure as Party Leader.

In this context, the *Belt & Road Initiative (BRI)* stands out as one of the main expressions of Chinese increasing international assertiveness, reflecting the desire to expand regional and global political influence. The initiative not only represents an ambitious plan to promote regional development and connectivity through infrastructure investments, but also constitutes a slogan for Chinese political power and advanced statecraft. Moreover, the initiative can be seen as a symptom of Chinese high coordination capacity between internal and external financial institutions, representing an important leap in the efficient organization of multilateral finance. China will not only be a participant and financier of infrastructure abroad but will exert its power by developing economic cooperation. In such a context, the 19th Congress was not only about power but also ideology: building a community of shared values that has nothing to do with the current one.

Furthermore, BRI was regarded as a direct response to the *Transpacific Partnership (TPP)*, which excluded China and reflected an opposite approach to investment promotion in the region: while the TPP, initially led by the United States, aimed to establish strict rules for trade and investment in Asia & the Pacific, BRI was conceived as a highly flexible instrument for promoting Chinese influence and investments – without a fixed budget, timetable or project criteria. The TPP, in fact, was highlighted as part of the Obama Administration's U.S. policy for China to "engage but insure", featuring components of cooperation – with trade and investment expansion – while simultaneously establishing control mechanisms, through economic regulation via TPP and military alliances with Asian partners.

Indeed, the nature of the relationship between China and the United States – whether it tends to confrontation or cooperation – was strongly emphasized as the main structural characteristic expected to shape the international order in the 21st century. In contrast to the Obama Administration's approach, President Donald Trump's stance towards China has been characterized by hostile rhetoric since his campaign. Accordingly, in August 2017 Trump commanded investigations concerning possibly discriminatory Chinese trade policies and practices, supposedly harmful to American intellectual property rights, innovation and technological development. However, Trump's hostile stance has been downgraded towards a more cooperative attitude, as observed in his recent visit to Beijing - though uncertainties remain concerning the opening of the Chinese economy for foreign investments.

Finally, as a major trend in Chinese foreign and economic policy, participants highlighted the massive presence of Chinese investments in Latin America – especially in Brazil and Peru – in the sectors of energy, mining, agriculture and infrastructure. In this respect, contrary to most interpretations, it was argued that the effects of the *Belt & Road Initiative*, to a certain extent, could also be observed in Latin America, where numerous infrastructure projects are financed by Chinese actors. The increasing presence of Chinese investments in Brazil was ultimately regarded as a key component of bilateral economic relations – contributing positively to the development of critical infrastructure, especially in remote areas, and to reducing regional income disparities.

Participantes da Terceira Reunião

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6. Primeiro-Secretário Jean Karydakis	
7. Segundo-Secretário Tiago Ribeiro dos Santos	
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