

# Multilateralism and the Management of Global Public Goods

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Anna Jaguaribe

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# Multilateralism and the Management of Global Public Goods

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**Anna Jaguaribe**

Trustee at CEBRI

International Politics **Reorientation of Multilateralism**

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This article reflects discussions of the CEBRI-KAS Project on the future directions of multilateralism.



The end of the cold war brought a new impetus to the discussion of global governance introducing into the governance debate the topic of global public goods, viewed in this context as intangible goods made common by virtue of globalization. The global agenda was premised on the possibility that the post-cold war scenario and the wide impact of globalization in production and services made rules of governance for global public goods both warranted and politically feasible. The numerous reports and assemblies dedicated to the reform of the United Nation during the early years of the century testify to this political mood. Notwithstanding the gaps, contradictions and differences in economic power amongst global players, it was deemed possible to arrive at a set of rules for cooperation and policy instruments that would make the management of global public goods politically viable.

Much policy discussion derived from this debate. While the debate lost political weight with the wars in the Middle East and the stall in the reforms of the Breton Woods institutions it maintained its analytical sharpness. Today, the accumulation of economic, migration, financial crisis and the covid-19 pandemic has given new political perspective to the issue of global public goods. While all countries concur on the global nature of public goods and dangers, regulation of said problems is made more difficult by the frailty of multilateral institutions and the geopolitical context characterized by asymmetric power relations of a post hegemonic world.

To start, the new political context of asymmetric power relations has altered the nature of multilateral negotiations. While the UN, its agencies and associated organization seem diminished in effectiveness there is a new proliferation of regional and inter-regional security and economic agreements and more recently financial institutions which are outpacing traditional global negotiations and turning more complex policy making regarding public goods. The current US-China dispute, the withdrawal of the US from the Paris negotiation and the World Health Organization indicate that the setting of rules and global standards have become a major political and strategic battle. This note explores some of the difficulties involved in defining global public goods and devising a policy agenda in this field.

## The notion of global public goods: from conceptual tool to policy instrument

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**G**lobal public goods emerge from academia into the world of international negotiations in response to the governance needs and policy challenges posed by globalization. The concept originally refers to goods which, by virtue of two essential characteristics - non rivalry in consumption (one person's use does not detract from another) and non exclusivity in benefits (consumption cannot be singularly appropriated) - cannot be dealt with appropriately (provision and management) by the market mechanism.

The notion of imperfect market goods is already present in classical economic theory, but it will be Samuelson in his essay on the "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure" (Samuelson, 1954), which will give its present economic definition. Since then, the concept has been revised and enlarged to incorporate public goods which exist in a global context and emerge from the increased interdependency of socio-economic relations brought about by globalization.

Stiglitz identifies five such public goods: international economic stability, international security and political stability, international environment, international humanitarian assistance and knowledge. But the frontier of what constitutes a public good is elastic as it incorporates existing public goods extended to the global arena, but also new goods and bads generated and or undersupplied by increased global interactions (Stiglitz, 1999).

While the range of goods potentially classified as public increases with the moving frontiers of globalization, the extension of the concept from a single to a global market is not without conceptual difficulties and ambiguities. The problems arising range from providing a conceptual and juridical definition to global goods to determining safeguards and access to these goods, defining the terms for provision and mechanisms of distribution which respect their universal nature as well as mechanisms of surveillance which can guarantee compliance to agreements.

In its original economic conception, public goods

are a theoretical and (ahistorical) construct conceived to explain the provision of goods which cannot be optimally regulated by traditional market mechanisms (price). In its extended definition, the scope and meaning of the concept are altered. While the aetiology remains in part the same (non rivalry and non exclusivity) the concept is now geared towards explaining the contours and operations of the global market, how it generates new public goods and underprovides existing ones.

Attempts to rationalize the concept have led to a series of classifications regarding the degree of "publicness" of the good, its scope and nature, the level of universality it attains and the modalities of technology required for its distribution. Global public goods can range from basic natural commons such as the environment, to policy goods such an international trading system, final goods such as global public health, security, financial stability, and merit goods such as knowledge.

Kaul (1999; 2003) has elaborated an organizational triangle in which public goods are classified according to the level of "publicness" which they attain in consumption, decision-making and distribution of benefits. Barret (2004) analyses goods according to their range of universality, scope and nature but also process of delivery. Sagasti (2001) has formulated an ingenious definition which links the concept with the context in which it is provided. In this formulation global public goods pertain to three large domains; the domain of the global where they are defined, the domain of the networks which describes how they operate and the domain of the local which specifies how locally produced goods are latter transformed into global goods. Each of these domains in turn have their own forms of delivery and policy principles and incentives.

Some economic critics argue that the redefinition of public goods from market specific to global has transformed the concept into a meaningless category. When so many global governance issues became potential public goods, the

concept becomes a tautology (Kozul-Wright, 2000). Moreover, the problem seems to rest not so much on how extended the concept of public goods is but on the nature of the global public domain in which they exist.

To date, the theory and policy regarding public goods has been confined to national markets and the nation state. Public goods are distributed and safeguarded by the State as “common values” pertaining to the public realm. In traditional democratic thinking, “common good” and “public realm” are distinct but complementary concepts. Common goods are intangibles which lie beyond the realm of the market and which need to be provided and preserved in order to guarantee equality of opportunity for the exercise of democratic citizenship and the public realm is the domain in which such goods are provided.

The State is both the guarantor of the public realm and, according to the social-democratic tradition, the principle agent through which such goods are provided. In fact, the legitimacy of the State rests in part in its role of guarantor of the public space and the equality of entitlements for public goods.

Once the provision of public goods is transposed to the global domain, contradictions in governance are inevitable. There are no substitutes for national states in the global realm or global institutions which can guarantee entitlements or a level playing field for those claiming these entitlements. Increased “publicness” does not entail increased universality or access to entitlements and opportunities.

The rich discussion regarding “common pool resources” is pertinent to this issue as it expands the notion of “publicness” of said goods and consequently their regulation. As pointed by Ostrom (2010) and Coriat (2011) amongst others, the definition of public goods cannot be reduced to the issue of market imperfections. Between the exclusive right attached to private property and the public good that is open to everyone, there is a wide variety of situations in which rights can be distributed and moreover may be combined with rules of monetary exchange.

As recognition of the existence of “global public goods” become increasingly consensual, the manner in which the global community can manage and allocate resources for the governance of these goods remains a matter of increasing dispute. The problem ceases to be economic and becomes political. At stake is not just the management of economic interdependences or the underprovision of goods engendered by globalisation but the possibilities for governance of a global public realm. More specifically, arriving at an accepted definition of “publicness” for said goods, defining the prospects for guaranteeing entitlements, developing regulatory mechanisms and/or making existing international institutions more inclusive, and finally developing modalities of political cooperation which can guarantee the operation of the system. In short, the provision of global public goods without the prerequisite of global government.

Danilo Zolo (2002) debating the possibilities of global governance indicates three basic reasons whereby the search for global governance from a top down perspective is fraught. The first reason is methodological, it implies a domestic analogy with regards to government which is untenable in global terms. The second refers to the fact that global rules (or the search for global peace) often sediment the perspective of those in command, severely reducing the possibilities of change. Thirdly, for philosophical reasons, as there is to date no philosophical reflection on human nature which could serve as the aetiology for the basis of common basic global public goods. In spite of the absence of an appropriate political philosophy for grounding international agreements over global public goods, there is a growing consensus that economic globalization gives rise to a global public realm which requires regulation.

## Globalization and global public goods

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From an economic and political perspective, there is substantial agreement that the last wave of globalization is both qualitatively and quantitatively different from its earlier versions. This difference does not rest in quantitative factors - the weight of trade and investments in determining growth (also relevant in previous globalization waves), the deregulation of exchange markets and the subsequent increase in cross-border financial flows - but on the emergence of global production, processing and communication technologies and global value chains which have altered the manner in which goods are produced, knowledge is transmitted and people communicate and interact (Nayyar, 2002).

Globalization creates economic practices and epistemic communities which do not correspond to political geographies, and forms of interaction which rely more on “mediatic” experience than in the sense of place (Appandurai, 1996). It has also profoundly altered power relations between global players. Global value chains respond to the largest part of trade. Increasing interdependencies between markets, states and peoples expands the number of global public goods in demand but also increases the political problems of regulation, administration and entitlements.

The last cycle of technology driven globalization created singular contradictions between the transformative capacity of technology and processes of diffusion, management and appropriation of technological change. Such enabling and empowering possibilities of technology as the transformation in production processes and existence of common technology pools are being curtailed by geopolitical considerations and privatization of scientific processes. The market orientation and management of big data, concentration of investments and new forms of capital accumulation based on restrictive patents and copyrights increasingly makes access to information and knowledge a new form of market right.

Economic opportunities are also being reduced by more entrenched forms of concentration of research and new barriers to technology

acquisition are re-emerging. As a result, while the technological conditions for development have remarkably changed and the rise and affirmation of China testifies to that, the possibilities of leapfrogging and surpassing the barriers of secondary innovation are diminishing.

Catching up strategies which have been effective twenty years ago in export promotion and low-level entry into global value chains no longer represent real or feasible development solutions today (Lall, 2002). Competition amongst middle income economies accentuates the “race for the search of additional value added” in international markets. The drive towards setting international standards for the innovation economy reflects the complexities of competition in the global economy but also the potentially strategic role of standards. Moreover, the aftermath of the financial crisis and the difficulties of establishing regulatory principles which are evenly accepted goes to show how real are the limits of global regulatory instances.

While vital processes such as macroeconomic and financial policy often escape the regulatory purview or tutelage of individual States, the rhetoric, jurisprudence and overall institutional infrastructure of international relations and cooperation continues to be based upon the interrelations between States although, as the financial and debt crisis have shown, corporations are more often than not the significant global player. Globalization diminishes national policy space and affects the modalities of economic regulation within the nation state without creating a level playing field for non-state actors. States, however, continue to be the ultimate responsible player for settling contradictions between national goals and global objectives. The crisis of Greece is a case in point.

In an integrated financial world, national policy options become increasingly shaped by global forces and individually tailored solutions to economic problems are often inefficient. With increasing economic interdependency, national states became partial tributaries to global trends widening the potential divide between national objectives and global trends.

As international competition exacerbates the stakes for economic gains and losses, establishing common international economic regulations and norms becomes more complex. States will pursue discriminatory access to markets to the detriment of global welfare and often agreed regional objectives. The protracted and negative prospects for trade negotiations of the Doha development round testify to this trend.

Diverging economic positions, contrasting political motivations and negotiation abilities of global players increase the difficulties of creating a level playing field around which negotiating rules can be established. It also makes more blatant the inadequateness of international institution and more pressing the search for parameters and guidelines to regulate the inter-relationship between states and between states and non-state global players.

The current demise of trade and security negotiations and the emergence of regional and plurinational agreements between like-minded states are good examples. In the view of US intelligence analysts the trade agreements are an important step in guaranteeing that trade rules continue to respond to US interests. Blackwill and Tellis (2015) argue that the US needs a new grand strategy towards China that centres on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than contributing to assist its ascendancy. This strategy should not be based on containment but on the recognition that US primacy in the global system must be preserved. Amongst its various objectives are recreating technology control regimes and new preferential trading agreements.

Independently of whether or not the new trade agreements will bring economic gains to those participating, they are, as pointed out by Dani Rodrick (2015), shrouded in contradictions in their political logic, mixing together mercantilists and comparative advantage arguments. Clauses regarding intellectual property and investment protection of corporations are important elements in the conflict. and go a long way to curtail future global regulatory provisions. As trade agreements become alternatives to global rules, the issue of regulating global public goods gains a new strategic political value. The diminishing relevance of established multilateral institutions shifts the debate concerning global rules from the realm of "norms" to the realm of strategic interests.



## Governance and the provision of global public goods

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International negotiations are, more often than not, a power play among uneven hands. The negotiation lessons of many successful social democracies are not easily transported into the global domain. Still, the search for international normative is based on the assumption that the evident need for international cooperation can move the international community away from the prospects of the prisoner's dilemma, where the pursuit of self-interest leads to the loss of all. Or, that the current process of globalization will be politically unmanageable should not some agreements be reached which are conducive to a more broad-based administration of global public goods.

The case for possible governance rests on the possibility of virtuous agreements between national and global interests as well as on the feasibility of increasing the representativeness of international organizations thereby decreasing the relevance of the power gap between global players. This vision is couched on the reasonable although partial premises:

- that the awareness of systemic risks increases the political motivation for action;
- that contradictions between national public goods and global commons increases the need for negotiation and expands as well as sharpens the modalities of partial agreements which can be applied to the pursuit of public goods;
- that the "glocal" (global + local) perception of both interests and values efficiently and effectively operates as a voice in favour of a governance agenda;
- that self-interest can be broadened into common pool interests and thereby create a basis for a bottom up system of partial regulations.

Awareness of systemic risks may not be a sufficient, but it is certainly a necessary motivation for action. The number of epistemic communities dedicated to the analysis of basic commons is growing as is the degree of consensus of the international

scientific community over the needs to arrive at systemic solutions for global problems. With increasing evidence in favor of collective solutions for climate change, the societal pressures for regulating the emissions is rising.

Moreover while globalization exacerbates potential contradictions between national and global interests, there are several significant examples in which enhancing national policy space has contributed to the provision of global goods. The adoption of UNESCO's convention for the protection of cultural diversity is one such example. The development of generic medicines for fighting HIV/AIDS is another excellent example where national alternatives to global monopolies have enhanced the collective capacity to manage global crisis and increased the call for the social accountability of corporations. Migration and its impact on social relations and employment structures is another pressing issue in which national debate and legislation will open and close precedents for international human rights legislation.

Kaul (2003) suggests that three types of gaps need to be bridged in pursuit of a feasible cooperation platform for global public goods: the incentive gap to define gains and compensations amongst players, the juridical gap in principles of "subsidiarity" and the participation gap in existing international institutions.

As public goods increase with the expanding frontiers of globalization so does the number and nature of issues which compose a possible platform of cooperation. A political agenda for global public goods cannot be conceived as a "closed cooperation platform" but should be viewed as an open-ended set of problems. The pursuit of political avenues for cooperation must take into account the different attributes, priorities and capacities to implement agreements of the international players.

But, cooperation is also premised on institutional reform. As noted by Zedillo (2005) in his analysis of prospects for WTO negotiations, mechanisms

which remediate losses and or stimulate cooperation must not be part of trade agreements, but part of the institutional framework which enables the bargaining and regulatory process.

In a 2004 Secretary General report on globalization, the UN proposed that the search for rules which can serve as the basis for cooperation must be multilateral and multidimensional. It must be an institutional process which is inclusive in order to be legitimate, bypass the confines of the national states and be developed in coordination and cooperation with new and emerging global actors. It must, in other words, take into account the profoundly altered nature of the international political system, but at the same time be based on a realistic assessment of existing power positions.

The appeal of a political agenda for global public goods lies precisely in the variety of issues involved. The expanding frontier which defines global goods, the multiple facets of political negotiations, the variety of participants involved and the new jurisprudence and new grounds for international cooperation which this agenda can generate.

The challenge of reconciling national and global priorities starts within the confines of national states. As evidenced by the Kyoto protocol, the provision, costs and administration of global public goods starts at the national level as does the political consciousness of the needs to promote them and the juridical basis for their implementation. It is also at the level of national states that negotiations between corporations and civil society take shape and where the search for accountability starts. "Glocal" politics are in this regard the central node of the political process of building an agenda for public goods and it is the lobbying capacity of civil society at the national level and its propensity to absorb international issues as its own which pushes the frontiers of reform and engagement. Held (1988) has argued that globalization represents more accurately the expansion of the terms of political activity and the range of actors involved in political life, rather than the death of politics.

But, as discussions over public goods within the UN and other international institutions in particular the WTO demonstrate, global politics is not a reedited and enlarged version of national democratic policies in search of a new and enlarged democratic covenant. The passage from national agreement, presuming that this agreement is possible, to international cooperation in such diverse fields as trade, environment, and development is complex and uneven. New players and political positions enter into play, exacerbating differences and contrasting vested interests and motivations, constantly altering the prospects of establishing rules of engagement. Existing international agencies have their own programme agenda which weights in shaping a framework for international discussions and States have profoundly diverging views of the process of international cooperation.

Thus far, discussions over global public goods have been an open political process where the particularities of the post-Cold War play a determining hand. The nodes and central elements of this political process are the breakdown of consensus regarding the virtues of multilateral negotiations, the increasing use of bilateral negotiations as leverage in determining positions in multilateral rounds, the varying and shifting geometry of alliances amongst and between diverse global payers, and the asymmetrical potential for action of civil society.

It is difficult to envision radical changes in this scenario and as such the prospects for agreement on global public goods have to be mediated by the windows of opportunities which this process might entail.

These openings no doubts include the dynamic and expanding agenda of issues associated with public goods, its potential to mobilize diversified players and causes in the direction of increasing public discussion, as well as the growing awareness of systemic risks and the rise of epistemic communities dedicated to the advocacy of collective solutions. While there are no ideal type models of negotiation, positive prospects remain as always a virtue of enlightened self-interest and political will.

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+55 (21) 2206-4400  
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